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Matthew Lewans 
 
 
“Our administrative law is a never-ending construction site where one crew builds structures 
and then a later crew tears them down to build anew, seemingly without an overall plan.”1  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Like a hundred-year-old heritage home, the law governing judicial review of 
administrative action attracts conflicting opinions. Everyone agrees that it has a 
sound constitutional foundation, which guarantees2 that administrative decisions 
remain subject to independent scrutiny in order to ensure they are rendered fairly3 
and comply substantively with the rule of law.4 But almost no one is satisfied with 
the outdated aspects of its infrastructure, particularly the arcane “law office 
metaphysics”5 lawyers and judges employ in order to determine the standard of 
review independently of “the who, what, why and wherefor of the litigant’s 
complaint on the merits.”6  
 
So every year administrative lawyers, judges, and law professors offer 
suggestions for reconstructing the law of judicial review by penning thoughtful 
                                                 
 Associate Professor, University of Alberta. This is a revised version of a paper presented on 18 
November 2016 at the Canadian Bar Association Annual Administrative Law, Labour and Employment 
Law Conference. Thanks to Ashton Menuz for her excellent research assistance and to David Mullan and 
the anonymous reviewers for their constructive criticism. Comments are welcome at lewans@ualberta.ca.   
 
1 David Stratas, “The Canadian Law of Judicial Review: A Plea for Doctrinal Coherence and Consistency” 
(February 17, 2016) at 1, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733751>.  
 
2 Crevier v Québec (AG), [1981] 2 SCR 220 at 236, 127 DLR (3d) 1 [Crevier].  
 
3 David Mullan, “Fairness: The New Natural Justice?” (1975) 25 UTLJ 281; Nicholson v Haldimand-
Norfolk Regional Police Commissioners, [1979] 1 SCR 311, 88 DLR (3d) 671 [Nicholson]; Knight v 
Indian Head School Division No 19 [1990] 1 SCR 653, 69 DLR (4th) 489 [Knight]; Baker v Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174 DLR (4th) 193 [Baker]; Geneviève 
Cartier, “Procedural Fairness in Legislative Functions: The End of Judicial Abstinence?” (2003) 53 UTLJ 
217.  
 
4 Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, 16 DLR (2d) 689; Baker, supra note 3; David Dyzenhaus & 
Evan Fox-Decent, “Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction: Baker v Canada” (2001) 51 UTLJ 193 
at 240; David Dyzenhaus (ed), The Unity of Public Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004). 
 
5 New Brunswick (Board of Management) v Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9 at para 122, [2008] 1 SCR 190 
[Dunsmuir]. 
 
6 Ibid at para 154.   
 UNBLJ    RD UN-B  [VOL/TOME 68 
 
 
110 
opinions,7 extra-judicial essays,8 and academic articles.9 The common theme running 
through many of these contributions is that the Dunsmuir framework is flawed, but 
there remains deep disagreement about how to repair it. Some argue we should avoid 
sharp distinctions between different standards of review, because the intensity of 
judicial review is irreducibly variable and therefore must be calibrated to suit a 
particular administrative decision;10 some propose to demolish the categories 
reserved for correctness scrutiny,11 so as to facilitate reasonableness review across 
the board;12 and some propose to expand Dunsmuir’s categories for correctness 
scrutiny in order to impose some semblance of judicial order on an otherwise 
heterogeneous corpus of administrative law.13 And then there are those who think we 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Edmonton (City) v Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd, 2016 SCC 47, 402 DLR 
(4th) 236 [Edmonton East] reversing Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd v Edmonton (City), 
2015 ABCA 85, 12 Alta LR (6th) 236; Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, 2016 SCC 29, [2016] 1 
SCR 770 [Wilson]; Commission scolaire de Laval c Syndicat de l’enseignement de la region de Laval, 
2016 SCC 8, [2016] 1 SCR 29 [Commission scolaire]; Canadian Broadcasting Corp v SODRAC 20013 
Inc, 2015 SCC 57, [2015] 3 SCR 615 [Canadian Broadcasting Corp]; Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship 
and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61, [2015] 3 SCR 909 [Kanthasamy]; Canada (Human Rights Commission) 
v Canada (AG), 2016 FCA 200, 402 DLR (4th) 160 [Canada (Human Rights Commission)]; Gitxaala 
Nation v R, 2016 FCA 187, 485 NR 258; Kabul Farms Inc v R, 2016 FCA 143, 13 Admin LR (6th) 11; 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, 396 DLR (4th) 527 
[Huruglica]; Trinity Western University v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016 ONCA 518, 131 OR (3d) 
113 leave to appeal to SCC granted [2016] SCCA No 418; Intact Insurance Co v Allstate Insurance Co of 
Canada, 2016 ONCA 609, 131 OR (3d) 625; Québec v ED, 2016 QCCA 536, 265 ACWS (3d) 797 leave 
to appeal to SCC granted [2016] SCCA No 223; Kenyon v British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor 
Vehicles), 2015 BCCA 485, 82 BCLR (5th) 266; Trinity Western University v Law Society of British 
Columbia, 2016 BCCA 423, 92 BCLR (5th) 42 leave to appeal to SCC granted 2017 CarswellBC 504 
(WL Can); Stewart v Elk Valley Coal Corporation, 2015 ABCA 225, 19 Alta LR (6th) 219 [Stewart] 
leave to appeal to SCC granted [2015] SCCA No 389; Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society v Trinity Western 
University, 2016 NSCA 59, 376 NSR (2d) 1; New Brunswick (Minister of Education) v Kennedy 2015 
NBCA 58, 444 NBR (2d) 92.  
 
8 Stratas, supra note 1; Simon Ruel, “What is the Standard of Review to be Applied to Issues of 
Procedural Fairness?” (2016) 29 Can J Admin L & Prac 259; Beverley McLachlin, “Administrative Law 
is not for Sissies: Finding a Path through the Thicket” (2016) 29 Can J Admin L & Prac 127. 
 
9 David Jones, “Administrative Law in 2016: Update on Caselaw, Recent Trends and Related 
Developments” (2016) online: <sagecounsel.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/CBA-Recent-Dev-Sept-
16.pdf>; Paul Daly, “Struggling Towards Coherence in Canadian Administrative Law? Recent Cases on 
Standard of Review and Reasonableness” (2016) McGill LJ (forthcoming) online at: 
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2821099>; Frank Falzon, “Statutory Interpretation, 
Deference and the Ambiguous Concept of “Ambiguity” on Judicial Review’ (2016) 29 Can J Admin L & 
Prac 135; Shaun Fluker, “Where Are We Going on Standard of Review in Alberta?” (2015)  online: 
<ablawg.ca/2015/03/13/where-are-we-going-on-standard-of-review-in-alberta/>; Lorne Sossin, “The 
Complexity of Coherence: Justice LeBel’s Administrative Law” (2015) SCLR (2d) 145.  
 
10 Stratas, supra note 1; Hilary Cameron, “Substantial Deference and Tribunal Expertise post-Dunsmuir: 
A New Approach to Reasonableness Review” (2014) 27 Can J Admin L & Prac 1.  
 
11 Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at paras 57–61.  
 
12 Wilson, supra note 7 at paras 28–38. See also Falzon, supra note 9; David Dyzenhaus, “Dignity in 
Administrative Law: Judicial Deference in a Culture of Justification” (2012) 17 Rev Const Stud 87.  
 
13 Ibid at para 89, per Côté and Brown JJ dissenting. See also Commission scolaire, supra note 7 at para 
79, per Côté, Wagner and Brown JJ dissenting; Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, 2015 FCA 17, 
467 NR 201; Huruglica, supra note 7 at para 52; Edmonton East, supra note 7; Stewart, supra note 7; 
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should forgo renovations altogether – at least for the time being – because they 
would destabilize an already wobbly analytical framework.14     
  
In this paper, I want to highlight some of the more remarkable contributions 
to the debate regarding the standard of review over the past year. But before 
proceeding, I want to revisit the history to that debate, because if we lose track of 
important points of reference we might forget some hard-won lessons and thereby 
lose the ability to critically assess contemporary proposals for reform.  
 
In Part II, I will briefly review the history of judicial review in order to 
identify two conflicting, but enduring, intellectual frameworks that have shaped that 
enterprise. The first, formalist intellectual framework relies upon a set of abstract 
analytical distinctions from which judges purport to deduce the parameters of 
judicial review without encroaching upon the merits of an administrative decision. 
The second intellectual framework conceives of judicial review as an evaluative 
exercise whereby judges scrutinize administrative decision-making processes and 
reasons in order to ensure that they are consistent with fundamental values which 
underpin the legitimacy of administrative law. The formalist approach is typified by 
elaborate attempts to define and deduce the scope of judicial review as a threshold 
matter without considering the attributes of a particular administrative decision, 
whereas the evaluative approach proceeds more directly to assess whether a 
particular administrative decision has been produced and explained in a fair and 
reasonable manner which warrants the respect of individuals and other legal 
officials. I will argue that the current controversy regarding the standard of review 
analysis stems from the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir erected a 
more elaborate formalist apparatus for determining the standard of review, which has 
distracted attention from the fundamental values which underwrite the legitimacy of 
administrative law and the moral purposes of judicial review. Thus, instead of 
simplifying the law of judicial review, the Dunsmuir framework has produced an 
esoteric and unproductive debate about how to define and delineate Dunsmuir’s 
formal concepts and categories instead of elucidating how the legitimacy of 
administrative decisions are tied to their legality in a procedural and substantive 
sense.  
 
In Part III, I will examine and critique four proposals for reforming the law 
of judicial review that surfaced in Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd – a case 
which served as a lightning rod for the standard of review debate in 2016. I will 
argue that each of these proposals are unlikely to produce a more principled 
approach to judicial review, because they seek to resolve confusion about the 
standard of review by either buttressing Dunsmuir’s formalist apparatus or adding 
                                                                                                                   
Lauren Wihak, “Whither the correctness standard of review? Dunsmuir, six years later’ (2014) 27 Can J 
Admin L & Prac 173. 
 
14 Wilson, supra note 7 at paras 70–73 per McLachlin CJ, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, and Cromwell 
JJ, concurring.  
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new refinements to it instead of honing an evaluative methodology for assessing the 
legality of administrative decisions across a broad range of regulatory contexts.  
 
Finally, in Part IV I will conclude by offering a tentative proposal about how we 
might move beyond the perennial fascination with the standard of review analysis by 
explaining how judicial review can sustain the procedural and substantive legality of 
administrative decisions without resorting to categorical or conceptual claims 
regarding the scope of judicial review. I will argue that such an approach can be 
gleaned by revisiting the normative underpinnings of L’Heureux-Dubé J’s landmark 
opinion in Baker v Canada in order to better understand why administrative 
decisions which are fair and reasonable merit judicial respect.     
 
 
II. A Brief History of Judicial Review 
 
Complaints about the erratic nature of judicial review are hardly new. In fact, the 
common criticism that the law of judicial review is radically incoherent has not 
changed much since DM Gordon’s scathing critique of jurisdictional error in 1929.15 
In undertaking what he likened to a Herculean labour to “ventilate one of the worst 
corners of the Augean stable,” Gordon remarked that “[a]nything like a serious 
examination at large of the case law on jurisdiction must convince an open-minded 
inquirer that there is virtually no proposition so preposterous that some show of 
authority to support it cannot be found.”16 In this respect, Gordon strikes the same 
note as David Stratas, Canada’s leading administrative law judge, who noted in 2016 
that “[d]octrinal incoherence and inconsistency plague the Canadian law of judicial 
review. This must stop.”17  
 
The doctrinal incoherence that Gordon, Stratas, and many others have 
criticized has a long pedigree,18 but the basic problem is that judges struggle to 
articulate a legal framework for judicial review which avoids both judicial 
quiescence and judicial overreach, and is equally applicable to decisions rendered by 
arbitrators,19 labour adjudicators,20 immigration officials,21 copyright boards,22 
                                                 
15 DM Gordon, “The Relation of Facts to Jurisdiction” (1929) 45 Law Q Review 459. 
 
16 Ibid at 459–460.  
 
17 Stratas, supra note 1 at 1.  
 
18 See e.g. John Willis, “Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the 
Functional” (1935) 1 UTLJ 53; Bora Laskin, “Certiorari to Labour Boards: The Apparent Futility of 
Privative Clauses” (1952) 30 Can Bar Rev 986; Paul Weiler, “The ‘Slippery Slope’ of Judicial 
Intervention: The Supreme Court and Canadian Labour Relations 1950-1970” (1971) 9 Osgoode Hall LJ 
1; David Mullan, “The Re-emergence of Jurisdictional Error” (1985) 14 Admin LR 326; H Wade 
McLaughlin, “Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretations of Law: How Much Formalism Can We 
Reasonably Bear?” (1986) 36 UTLJ 343; David Mullan, “The Supreme Court of Canada and 
Jurisdictional Error: Compromising New Brunswick Liquor” (1987) 1 Can J Admin L & Prac 71; David 
Mullan, “Jurisdictional Error Yet Again: The Imprecise Limits of the Jurisdiction-Limiting Canada 
(Attorney General) v PSAC’ (1993) 11 Admin LR (2d) 117.  
 
19 Commission scolaire de Laval, supra note 7. 
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human rights tribunals,23 law societies,24 and countless other administrative 
agencies.25 The history of how judges have wrestled with this problem is worth 
recounting briefly, because it helps explain how we got into this standard of review 
mess in the first place, and to gauge whether we are any closer to cleaning it up.  
 
The doctrine of jurisdictional error, which continues to lurk within the 
Dunsmuir framework, grounded the dominant approach to judicial review until 1978. 
Its underlying constitutional premise was that the different branches of government 
perform analytically distinct roles: legislatures have the exclusive power to create 
law, the judiciary has exclusive power to interpret law, and administrative officials 
wield residual discretionary power to render findings of fact and implement laws 
created by the legislature and interpreted by the judiciary.26 The important point is 
that this conception of the separation of powers reserved questions of law 
exclusively to superior courts, while administrative officials merely retained a 
discretionary power to apply the law to a particular set of facts. When defined in this 
way, the doctrine of jurisdictional error seemed to be based upon an apolitical (and 
therefore constitutionally acceptable) account of judicial review, whereby judges 
determine “jurisdictional” questions of law, but nevertheless allow administrative 
officials to determine “non-jurisdictional” questions, usually relating to findings of 
fact and public policy questions left undetermined by statute.27 But despite projecting 
a sense of certainty and predictability regarding the conduct of judicial review, the 
doctrine was formalistic, reductive, controversial, and radically incoherent in 
practice.  
 
It was formalistic, because it was designed to articulate and maintain 
abstract conceptual distinctions instead of ensuring that governmental decisions 
(regardless of their abstract classification) were consistent with fundamental legal 
values.28 Thus, instead of explaining how judicial review might vindicate the dignity 
                                                                                                                   
20 Wilson, supra note 7. 
 
21 Kanthasamy, supra note 7; Huruglica, supra note 7.  
 
22 Canadian Broadcasting Corp, supra note 7.  
 
23 Canada (Human Rights Commission), supra note 7; Stewart, supra note 7.  
 
24 Trinity Western University v Law Society of Upper Canada, supra note 7; Trinity Western University v 
Law Society of British Columbia, supra note 7; Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society v Trinity Western 
University, supra note 7. 
 
25 Sossin, supra note 9.  
 
26 Martin Loughlin, “Procedural Fairness: A Study of the Crisis in Administrative Law Theory” (1978) 28 
UTLJ 215; David Dyzenhaus, “Formalism’s Hollow Victory” (2002) NZLR 525 [Dyzenhaus, 
“Formalism’s Hollow Victory”]. For an historical account of how a formalist conception of the separation 
of powers informed the doctrine of jurisdictional error, see Matthew Lewans, Administrative Law and 
Judicial Deference (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016) chapters 3 and 5.  
 
27 See, e.g. Rex v Nat Bell Liquors, Ltd, [1922] 2 AC 128 (JCPC).  
 
28 Loughlin, supra note 26; Dyzenhaus, “Formalism’s Hollow Victory” supra note 26 at 527; David 
Dyzenhaus, “Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative Law” (2002) 27 
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of individuals by ensuring that administrative decisions are rendered fairly and 
provide a public, intelligible, and rationally acceptable legal justification, legal 
analysis was preoccupied with the relatively esoteric exercise of slotting 
administrative action into conceptual categories that had no intrinsic connection to 
principles of political morality. If, for example, a reviewing court deemed that an 
administrative decision involved a “jurisdictional” question or the exercise of 
“judicial” or “quasi-judicial” power, the decision would be quashed if a trial-type 
process had not been observed even in the face of privative clause.29 Conversely, if a 
judge deemed that an administrative decision involved the exercise of 
“administrative” power, the decision would be upheld regardless of whether there 
had been a hearing.30 The upshot was an all-or-nothing approach to judicial review, 
which hinged on an arbitrary, formal categorization of administrative action rather 
than ensuring that administrative decisions reflected core values which underpin the 
legitimacy of administrative law.31   
 
It was reductive, because it distorted the reality that legislatures regularly 
delegate authority to administrative officials in order to decide questions of law 
through a variety of rule-making, adjudicative, and policy development powers in 
order to realize broadly-worded statutory objectives. While a legislative assembly 
might be capable of forging sufficient political consensus to enact open-textured 
objectives and enabling provisions as general guides for administrative action, these 
utterances rarely provide sufficiently detailed edicts to determine the array of 
interpretive disputes that typically give rise to judicial review proceedings. For 
example, legislative assemblies frequently recognize that they cannot foresee 
subsequent socio-economic or technological developments, and conclude that 
administrative decision-making processes provide a more accessible, fair, and 
efficient forum for individuals to tender evidence and legal arguments about how the 
law ought to be interpreted and applied to a specific set of facts. These institutional 
reasons explain one of the most important constitutional phenomena of the twentieth 
century: the rapid and inexorable development of the modern administrative state 
                                                                                                                   
Queen’s LJ 445 at 450; Paul Daly, “The Unfortunate Triumph of Form over Substance in Canadian 
Administrative Law” (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall LJ 317 at 320 [Daly, “Unfortunate Triumph”].  
 
29 See, e.g. Toronto Newspaper Guild v Globe Printing, [1953] 2 SCR 18, [1953] 3 DLR 561; Alliance des 
Professeurs Cotholiques de Montréal v  Quebec Labour Relations Board, [1953] 2 SCR 140, [1953] 4 
DLR 161; Saltfleet (Township) Board of Health v Knapman, [1956] SCR 877, 6 DLR (2d) 81; Jarvis v 
Associated Medical Services Inc, [1964] SCR 497, 44 DLR (2d) 407.    
 
30 See e.g. R v Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly, [1928] 1 KB 411; British Columbia 
(Labour Relations Board) v Traders Services Ltd, [1958] SCR 672, 15 DLR (2d) 305; Calgary Power v 
Copithorne, [1959] SCR 24, 16 DLR (2d) 241; Kinnaird v British Columbia (Workmen’s Compensation 
Board), [1963] SCR 239, 38 DLR (2d) 245; Québec (Commission des Relations Ouvrières) v Burlington 
Mills Hosiery Co of Canada, [1964] SCR 342, 45 DLR (2d) 730; Galloway Lumber Co v British 
Columbia (Labour Relations Board), [1965] SCR 222, 48 DLR (2d) 587; Bakery and Confectionary 
Workers International Union of America Local No 468 v White Lunch Ltd, [1966] SCR 282, 56 DLR (2d) 
193; Quebec (Commission des Relations de Travail) v Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co Ltd, [1968] SCR 695, 
1 DLR (2d) 417; Noranda Mines Ltd v Saskatchewan, [1969] SCR 898, 7 DLR (3d) 1.  
 
31 Dyzenhaus & Fox-Decent, supra note 4; Matthew Lewans, Administrative Law and Judicial Deference 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016) ch 6.   
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throughout the western industrialized world, which confounded reasoning premised 
upon a formalistic conception of the separation of powers.  
  
Consequently, the doctrine also proved to be controversial, because by 
assuming that the judiciary has exclusive power to determine jurisdictional questions 
of law, reviewing courts frequently reversed considered decisions rendered by 
administrative officials who had been empowered through the democratic process to 
decide those legal questions.32 For example, despite granting broad authority to 
administrative officials to interpret and apply labour and human rights codes, judges 
often ran roughshod over the decisions of labour boards33 and human rights 
tribunals34 even to the point of flouting statutory privative clauses. This pattern of 
judicial overreach raised serious concerns regarding the constitutional legitimacy of 
judicial review and the relative competency of the judiciary to supervise increasingly 
specialized regulatory regimes. One of Canada’s leading constitutional law scholars 
in the 20th century, Professor Bora Laskin, questioned the manner in which judges 
frequently circumvented privative clauses by arguing that “judicial persistence in 
exercising a reviewing power involves an arrogation of authority on the basis of 
constitutional principle (and there is no such principle) or on the basis of some ‘elite’ 
theory of knowing what is best for all concerned.”35 His point was that by gainsaying 
administrative decisions, judges frequently undermined the operation of institutions 
that play a vital role in modern democratic governance.  
 
Finally as Gordon, Laskin, John Willis, and many others were keen to point 
out, the doctrine was radically incoherent, because judges vacillated between a 
narrow conception of jurisdictional error (which focused on whether the express 
wording of the statute authorized an official to embark on an inquiry) and a broader 
conception (which interpreted enabling legislation against a background of common 
law principles like the principles of natural justice).36 However, much of this 
confusion was put to rest in cases like Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation 
                                                 
32 Willis, supra note 18; Harry Arthurs, “Protection Against Judicial Review” (1983) 43 R du B 277; 
Jeremy Waldron, “Authority for Officials” in Lukas Meyer, Stanley Paulson and Thomas Pogge (eds), 
Rights, Culture, and the Law: Themes from the Legal Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2003) 45.  
 
33 See, e.g. In re Ontario Labour Relations Board: Toronto Newspaper Guild, Local 87 v Globe Printing 
Company, [1953] 2 SCR 18, [1953] 3 DLR 561. For academic critique of this case see Laskin, supra note 
18; Weiler, supra note 18.  
 
34 See, e.g. Bell v Ontario Human Rights Commission, [1971] SCR 756, 18 DLR (3d) 1; Gay Alliance 
Toward Equality v Vancouver Sun, [1979] 2 SCR 435, 10 BCLR 257; Canada (AG) v Mossop, [1993] 1 
SCR 554, 100 DLR (4th) 658. For academic critique of correctness review in the human rights context, 
see Allison Harvison Young, “Keeping the Courts at Bay: The Canadian Human Rights Commission and 
its Counterparts in Britain and Northern Ireland: Some Comparative Lessons” (1993) 43 UTLJ 65; Allison 
Harvison Young, “Human Rights Tribunals and the Supreme Court of Canada: Reformulating Deference” 
(1993) 13 Admin LR (2d) 206. 
 
35 Laskin, supra note 18 at 991.  
 
36 See, e.g. the conflicting approaches outlined in the cases cited supra note 29 and note 30, and Weiler, 
supra note 18.  
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Commission, a case in which Lord Reid cast a very broad net for jurisdictional 
error,37 prompting HWR Wade to conclude that the House of Lords had effectively 
stripped administrative officials of their statutory authority to decide questions of 
law.38 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Canada quickly followed suit, collapsed 
the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors in Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co v International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 796, and 
held that judges should generally review questions of law on a correctness basis.39  
 
Beginning in 1978, the Supreme Court of Canada began constructing an 
alternative, evaluative framework for judicial review, which rejected the premise that 
only judges were entitled to determine questions of law. It recognized that 
administrative officials share responsibility for interpreting the law, but sought to 
preserve administrative fidelity to the rule of law by bolstering and extending 
administrative officials’ common law duty of procedural fairness and demonstrating 
how that duty entails substantive, but deferential, constraints on administrative 
action. That alternative approach was built upon three interlocking propositions. The 
first proposition is that administrative officials owe a general duty of fairness at 
common law that is triggered and shaped by contextual considerations (e.g. the 
practical impact of the decision on an individual’s rights, interests, property, 
privileges, or liberties) as opposed to being contingent strictly upon facts or judicial 
suppositions about legislative intent.40 This general duty of procedural fairness 
ensures that individuals affected by an administrative decision are entitled to 
participate meaningfully in administrative decision-making processes, and to be 
heard by an impartial decision-maker even when these procedural entitlements are 
not spelled out explicitly in enabling legislation. Nevertheless, the duty of fairness 
does not entail that administrative processes must conform to trial-type procedures; it 
requires fair treatment, but recognizes that an administrative decision-maker “is free, 
within reason, to determine its own procedures, which will vary with the nature of 
the inquiry and the circumstances of the case.”41 
 
The second proposition is that judges should refrain from casting a broad 
net for jurisdictional errors, and instead defer to administrative interpretations of law 
provided they are “rationally supported by the relevant legislation.”42 Because 
administrative officials are empowered through the democratic process to decide 
                                                 
37 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 AC 147 at 170 (HL) [Anisminic].  
 
38 HWR Wade, Administrative Law, 3rd ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) at 97.  
 
39 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co v International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 796, [1970] SCR 
425, 11 DLR (3d) 336.  
 
40 Nicholson, supra note 3 at 324–28; Martineau v Matsqui Disciplinary Board, [1980] 1 SCR 602 at 622–
23, 106 DLR (3d) 385.  
 
41 Kane v Board of Governors of the University of British Columbia, [1980] 1 SCR 1105 at 1112, 18 
BCLR 124.  
 
42 Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v New Brunswick Liquor Corporation, [1979] 2 SCR 
227 at 237, 25 NBR (2d) 237 [CUPE].  
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certain legal questions, and are more proficient in answering those questions than 
generalist judges, courts should eschew the Anisminic proposition that judges are 
entitled to review all questions of law on a correctness standard. Nevertheless, this 
did not mean that judges should defer blindly to administrative decisions; rather, it 
meant that judges engaged in a form of substantive quality control by verifying that 
an administrative decision-maker responds to the evidence, the parties’ submissions, 
and provides a conclusion which is rationally defensible in light of relevant legal 
principles.  
 
Third, while legislatures are constitutionally entitled to delegate authority to 
decide questions of law to administrative officials, they cannot immunize 
administrative decisions from public scrutiny because individuals have a 
constitutional right to judicial review.43 Thus, the parties who are bound by an 
administrative decision are entitled to challenge the legality of that decision before 
an independent judiciary to ensure that it has been rendered in a fair and legally 
justified manner.  
 
When viewed as a package, this evaluative framework rejects the premise 
that administrative officials are mere ciphers who implement laws which are created 
by legislatures and whose content are determined by judges. In its place, it 
recognizes that administrative officials are responsible for developing a body of 
administrative law that sits alongside legislation and the common law in a 
democratic legal order, and which merits the respect of both citizens and superior 
courts. Nevertheless, it seeks to uphold the rule of law by ensuring that 
administrative processes and decisions are articulated fairly (i.e. in a manner which 
responds to the evidence and arguments tendered by the parties) and reasonably (i.e. 
in a manner which is rationally justifiable in light of relevant legal principles drawn 
from legislation, regulations, the common law, etc.).44 Reduced to its essence, this 
understanding of judicial review holds that if an administrative decision is rendered 
in a fair and legally justified manner, other legal officials (including judges) should 
respect that decision instead of substituting their own determination of law in its 
place.    
 
However, instead of making a clean break with formalistic reasoning, the 
Supreme Court pursued a more subtle transition, which discouraged judges from 
casting a broad net for jurisdictional errors and instead emphasized contextual factors 
like the practical impact of the decision on the individual, the underlying purposes or 
objectives of the regulatory scheme, the democratic legitimacy of administrative 
institutions, and the relative expertise of administrative decision-makers.45 As a 
result, the complexity and confusion associated with judicial review proliferated, 
                                                 
43 Crevier, supra note 2 at 236.  
 
44 For a similar, theoretical account of the rule of law, see Lon Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harvard L Rev 353.  
 
45 See, eg UES, Local 298 v Bibeault, [1988] 2 SCR 1048 at 1088, 35 Admin LR 153; Knight, supra note 
3 at 669–77.  
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because even while paying lip-service to the idea that judges ought to review 
administrative decisions according to a deferential standard, they clung to formalist 
concepts and categories by continuing to review administrative decisions on a 
correctness standard if they deemed the issue in dispute to be “jurisdictional” or took 
the absence of an express privative clause as a green light for de novo review. And 
even when the Court did apply the reasonableness standard, it often resembled what 
David Mullan calls “disguised correctness review,”46 because the Court would first 
determine how it would have decided the matter (all things considered) and then 
proceed to consider whether an administrative decision was sufficiently proximate to 
the court’s to warrant judicial restraint.47   
 
This state of affairs often produced conflicted or confused judicial opinions. 
In decisions like Pezim v British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers)48 and 
Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam Inc,49 the Court held 
that judges should review administrative decisions according to a deferential 
standard of reasonableness even when the enabling legislation provides a statutory 
right of appeal, because administrative officials possess theoretical, experiential, or 
procedural forms of expertise. In this respect, the Court seemed to be extending the 
CUPE rationale for judicial deference regarding administrative interpretations of 
law.  
 
However, instead of simply stating that the justification for judicial 
deference persists in cases where an administrative decision is subject to a statutory 
right of appeal, the Court went on to say there was a “spectrum” of different degrees 
of judicial deference that incorporates the problematic distinctions between 
jurisdictional/non-jurisdictional issues and questions of law/fact which are hallmarks 
of formalistic analysis. In Pezim, Iacobucci J suggested that the highest degree of 
deference should be reserved for “cases where a tribunal protected by a true privative 
clause, is deciding a matter within its jurisdiction and where there is no statutory 
right of appeal,” and the lowest degree of deference would apply in cases concerning 
“the interpretation of a provision limiting the tribunal’s jurisdiction (jurisdictional 
error) or where there is a statutory right of appeal which allows the reviewing court 
to substitute its opinion for that of the tribunal and where the tribunal has no greater 
expertise on the issue in question, as for example in the area of human rights.”50 In 
Southam, he returned to this point in an attempt to clarify the analytical distinction 
between questions of law, fact, and mixed law and fact.51 While he acknowledged 
                                                 
46 David Mullan, “Unresolved Issues on Standard of Review in Canadian Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action—The Top Fifteen!” (2013) 42 Adv Q 1 at 76 [Mullan, “Unresolved Issues”].  
 
47 See, e.g. CAIMAW v Paccar of Canada Ltd, [1989] 2 SCR 983 at 1017-20, 40 BCLR (2d) 1 per 
Sopinka J, concurring [Paccar]. 
 
48 Pezim v British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 SCR 557, 92 BCLR (2d) 145 [Pezim].  
 
49 Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam Inc, [1997] 1 SCR 748, 144 DLR (4th) 1 
[Southam]. 
 
50 Pezim, supra note 48 at 590.  
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that this distinction might be problematic,52 his opinion provided fuel for the 
formalist notion that judges retain exclusive authority to determine general questions 
of law while the authority of administrative decisions was confined to findings of 
fact and matters of law application. And when the Court decided Dr Q v College of 
Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, McLachlin CJ declared that 
administrative decisions concerning “pure” questions of fact “will militate in favour 
of showing more deference towards the tribunal’s decision,” while decisions 
involving “pure” questions of law would attract “a more searching review” 
particularly in cases “where the decision will be one of general importance or great 
precedential value.”53  
 
Thus, even while acknowledging that judges should defer to administrative 
officials’ interpretation of their enabling statute, the Court suggested that judges 
should continue to review certain categories of administrative decisions on a 
correctness basis (e.g. “jurisdictional” questions, general questions of law, questions 
of law outside the expertise of the decision-maker). This discourse culminated in 
decisions like Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), in 
which Bastarache J outlined a multi-factor, pragmatic and functional framework for 
identifying the appropriate standard of review separate and apart from arguments 
relating to the process or substantive reasoning employed by the decision-maker.54 
That decision instructed judges to consider an array of contextual factors – the 
presence or absence of a privative clause, the expertise of the decision-maker, the 
purpose of the legislation as a whole as well as any provision in particular, and the 
nature of the issue in dispute. But in the process, Bastarache J conceived the 
pragmatic and functional framework primarily as an attempt to categorize the 
decision under review – with particular emphasis on determining whether an 
administrative decision involved questions of law the Court deemed to fall outside 
the tribunal’s expertise. At least in this respect, Pushpanathan seems to facilitate 
analysis quite similar to the doctrine of jurisdictional error – the difference is that 
“the language an approach of the ‘preliminary,’ ‘collateral’ or ‘jurisdictional’ 
question has been replaced by this pragmatic and functional approach.”55  
  
By contrast, L’Heureux-Dubé J’s opinion in Baker v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship) adopts an evaluative approach to judicial review, which focuses on 
whether a particular administrative process and decision comports with fundamental 
values instead of attempting to categorize the nature of the administrative decision in 
                                                                                                                   
51 Southam, supra note 49 at para 36.  
 
52 Ibid at paras 35, 37.  
 
53 Dr Q v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, 2003 SCC 19 at para 34, [2003] 1 SCR 
226. 
 
54 Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982 at paras 29–38, 
160 DLR (4th) 193 [Pushpanathan]. 
 
55 Ibid at para 28.  
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the abstract.56 Thus, she declared that it was “inaccurate to speak of a rigid 
dichotomy of ‘discretionary’ or ‘non-discretionary’ decisions” which entail different 
standards of review.57 Instead, she focused on whether the particular decision being 
reviewed (regardless of its categorization) was fair and reasonably justified.58 Much 
like Laskin CJ’s opinion in Nicholson, L’Heureux-Dubé J articulated a 
contextualized duty of fairness, whose purpose was “to ensure that administrative 
decisions are made using a fair and open procedure, appropriate to the decision being 
made and its statutory, institutional, and social context, with an opportunity for those 
affected by the decision to put forward their views and evidence fully and have them 
considered by the decision-maker.”59 However, she expanded upon that idea by 
explaining how the duty of fairness impacts the legal substance of an administrative 
decision. In addition to ensuring that an individual had been informed of the case 
against him and heard by an impartial decision-maker, the duty of fairness required 
administrative officials to provide reasons “where the decision has important 
significance for the individual.”60 Furthermore, she noted that those reasons must 
disclose a reasonable basis for the decision – one which demonstrates that the 
decision-maker was “alert, alive and sensitive” to relevant legal principles, including 
“the boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of the rule of law, the 
principles of administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian society, and the 
principles of the Charter.”61  
 
But instead of following L’Heureux-Dubé J’s lead in subsequent years, the 
Supreme Court focused its attention instead on defining different categories of 
administrative decisions so as to enable judges to identify the standard of review 
more efficiently.62 In his concurring opinion in Chamberlain v Surrey School District 
No 36, LeBel J made the insightful observation that a “formulaic” recitation of the 
pragmatic and functional framework frequently diverts attention “from the real issue 
of legality to an unnecessary exploration of tangential questions.”63 However, instead 
of employing the evaluative approach to judicial review set out in Baker, LeBel J 
sought rehabilitate the Pushpanathan framework by leaning more heavily upon 
formalistic reasoning. Thus, the Court soon began developing shortcuts around the 
pragmatic and functional approach by identifying abstract categories of issues that 
                                                 
56 Baker, supra note 3 at para 56. 
 
57 Ibid at para 54.  
 
58 Ibid at paras 51–56.  
 
59 Ibid at para 22.  
 
60 Ibid at para 43.  
 
61 Ibid at paras 56, 75.  
 
62 Interestingly, the Supreme Court has not tinkered with the multi-factor Baker framework for procedural 
fairness. Nevertheless, some have advocated for a unified framework for judicial review that would 
encompass both procedural and substantive grounds for review. See Paul Daly, “Canada’s Bi-Polar 
Administrative Law: Time for Fusion” (2014) 40 Queen’s LJ 213.   
 
63 Chamberlain v Surrey School District No 36, 2002 SCC 86 at para 202, [2002] 4 SCR 710.  
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would presumptively attract correctness review: constitutional questions,64 “true” 
jurisdictional issues,65 and general questions of law which are of central importance 
to the legal system.66  
This trend of heaping additional conceptual distinctions and categories onto the 
doctrinal structure of judicial review concludes with Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, a 
case in which the author of the Pushpanathan framework (Bastarache J) teamed up 
with its main critic (LeBel J) to coauthor an opinion with the aim of developing “a 
principled framework that is more coherent and workable.”67 That revised 
framework can be summarized as follows:  
 
(1) the Court abolished the patent unreasonableness standard of review (leaving 
only the reasonableness and correctness review);68 
(2) the Court held that it is unnecessary for a reviewing court to apply the 
contextual standard of review analysis when the standard of review has 
been settled by precedent;69 
(3) in cases where the standard of review is not settled by precedent, the Court 
held that reviewing courts should apply the standard of review analysis by 
considering contextual factors such as the presence or absence of a privative 
clause, the purpose of the tribunal as determined by reference to the 
enabling legislation, the nature of the question at issue, and administrative 
expertise;70 
(4) the Court attempted to simplify the process for identifying the appropriate 
standard of review by categorizing different types of issues which will 
presumptively attract either correctness or reasonableness review. The 
reasonableness standard applies presumptively to decisions protected by a 
privative clause, findings of fact, interpretations of an administrator’s 
enabling statute, the exercise of discretionary power, questions of public 
policy, and mixed questions of law and fact;71 whereas the correctness 
standard applies presumptively to constitutional questions, “true” 
jurisdictional issues, questions of law which are of general importance to 
                                                 
64 Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v 
Laseur, 2003 SCC 54 at para 31, [2003] 2 SCR 504; Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-
Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6 at para 20, [2006] 1 SCR 256.  
 
65 United Taxi Drivers’s Fellowship of Southern Alberta v Calgary (City), 2004 SCC 19 at para 5, [2004] 
1 SCR 485; ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd v Alberta (Energy Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4 at para 87, [2006] 
1 SCR 140.  
 
66 Toronto (City) v CUPE, Local 79, 2003 SCC 63 at para 62, [2003] 3 SCR 77.  
 
67 Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 32.  
 
68 Ibid at paras 41–2. 
 
69 Ibid at paras 57, 62.  
 
70 Ibid at paras 55, 64.  
 
71 Ibid at paras 52–4.  
 UNBLJ    RD UN-B  [VOL/TOME 68 
 
 
122 
the Canadian legal system and outside the expertise of the decision-maker, 
and jurisdictional boundaries between competing administrative agencies;72 
(5) finally, the Court attempted to define and distinguish the reasonableness and 
correctness standards of review.73 Reasonableness review is “concerned 
mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility 
within the decision-making process” so as to ensure that “the decision falls 
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in 
respect of the facts and law.”74 By contrast, correctness review entitles a 
court to “undertake its own analysis of the question” without regard for the 
rationale offered by an administrative decision-maker.75  
 
While the elimination of the patent unreasonableness standard has simplified judicial 
review to a point, it’s fair to say that the other reforms have not panned out as 
expected.76 There remains considerable doubt as to whether reliance on precedent 
will simplify the standard of review analysis because pre-Dunsmuir authorities have 
lost most of their luster, and any judge or counsel worth his or her salt can 
distinguish the nuances of a present case from past precedent.77  
 
But the main problem with the Dunsmuir framework derives from its 
attempt to simplify judicial review by setting out presumptive categories for 
reasonableness and correctness review which overshadow the normative purposes of 
judicial review. The problem is not just that the boundaries of these categories are 
unclear, under-inclusive, or over-inclusive – it’s that they are coincident as opposed 
to being mutually exclusive.78 As the history of jurisdictional error amply 
demonstrates, judges are frequently drawn to correctness review or a disguised form 
of it when an administrative decision-maker is interpreting her home statute.79 But 
                                                 
72 Ibid at paras 57–61.  
 
73 Ibid at paras 44–50.  
 
74 Ibid at para 47.  
 
75 Ibid.  
 
76 Given the parameters of this paper, I cannot offer an extended critique of Dunsmuir here. For more 
thorough discussion of the Dunsmuir case, see Daly, “Unfortunate Triumph”, supra note 28; Paul Daly, 
“Dunsmuir’s Flaws Exposed: Recent Decisions on Standard of Review” (2012) 58 McGill LJ 483 [Daly, 
“Dunsmuir’s Flaws Exposed”]; Mullan, “Unresolved Issues”, supra note 46.  
 
77 Mullan, “Unresolved Issues”, supra note 46 at 4–6; Stratas, supra note 1 at 3–4. 
 
78 Daly, “Unfortunate Triumph”, supra note 28 at 330; Daly, “Dunsmuir’s Flaws Exposed”, supra note 76 
at 488.  
 
79 See, e.g. Cromwell J’s protestation in Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta 
Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61 at para 98 [2011] 3 SCR 654 [Alberta Teachers’ Assoiation]: that 
“there are legal questions in ‘home’ statutes whose resolution the legislature did not intend to leave to the 
tribunal; indeed, it is hard to imagine where else the limits of an tribunal’s delegated power are more 
likely to be set out.” Some recent cases which demonstrate this line of thinking in action include 
Edmonton East, supra note 7; Stewart, supra note 7; Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society v Trinity Western 
University, supra note 7; Wilson, supra note 7 per Côté and Brown JJ dissenting; and Edmonton East, 
supra note 7 per Côté and Brown JJ dissenting.  
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similar observations can be made with respect to the other categories. For example, 
the resolution of constitutional questions often hinges upon findings of fact, mixed 
questions of law and fact, a deep understanding of the enabling legislation, or the 
broader regulatory context.80 Put simply, if one were to construct a Venn diagram of 
Dunsmuir’s presumptive categories there would be substantial areas of overlap, 
which explains why judges frequently disagree about whether a given case involves 
a general question of law outside an administrator’s expertise which entitles the court 
to determine the answer or a question concerning the interpretation of an 
administrator’s home statute which warrants judicial deference. The end product, 
unsurprisingly, is protracted litigation and judicial handwringing over whether a case 
can be slotted into a particular category in order to determine the appropriate 
standard of review. But more importantly, that protracted hand-wringing detracts 
from the more basic, evaluative task of verifying whether an administrative decision 
is fair and reasonably justified.  
 
This might explain why the Supreme Court has continued to tinker with the 
Dunsmuir standard of review analysis. While the Court has restrained itself from 
rewriting the standard of review analysis, it initially signaled a clear preference for 
reasonableness review in all cases concerning the interpretation of an administrator’s 
home statute,81 and extended the more deferential standard of review to cases where 
an administrative decision involves Charter values82 and general questions of law.83 
Moreover, while the Court did not abolish the concept of jurisdictional error, it has 
repeatedly gone out of its way to say that it may be time “to reconsider whether, for 
the purposes of judicial review, the category of true questions of jurisdiction exists 
and is necessary to identifying the standard of review.”84 This line of post-Dunsmuir 
cases has led at least one administrative lawyer to worry that the rule of law might be 
compromised insofar as judges might defer to administrative decisions on 
jurisdictional issues, constitutional issues, and general questions of law.85 But if one 
subscribes to a protestant conception of the rule of law which recognizes the 
                                                 
80 See, e.g. Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR 395 [Doré]; Loyola High School v 
Quebec (AG), 2015 SCC 12, [2015] 1 SCR 613 [Loyola High School]. See also Geneviève Cartier, “The 
Baker Effect: A New Interface Between the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 
Administrative Law—The Case of Discretion” in David Dyzenhaus, ed, The Unity of Public Law (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2004) 61.   
 
81 See, e.g. Alberta Teachers Association, supra note 79; Canadian National Railway v Canada (AG), 
2014 SCC 40, [2014] 2 SCR 135; Tervita Corp v Canada (Commissioner of Competition), 2015 SCC 3, 
[2015] 1 SCR 161; Ontario Energy Board v Ontario Power Generation Inc, 2015 SCC 44, [2015] 3 SCR 
147; Movement laïque Québécois v Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 SCR 3. 
 
82 See, e.g. Doré, supra note 80 at para 45; Loyola High School, supra note 80 at paras 37–40.  
 
83 Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc v Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals, 2011 
SCC 59 at para 4, [2011] 3 SCR 616.  
 
84 Alberta Teachers Association, supra note 79 at para 34. See also ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd v Alberta 
(Utilities Commission), 2015 SCC 45 at para 27, [2015] 3 SCR 219.  
 
85 Lauren Wihak, “Wither the Correctness Standard of Review? Dunsmuir, Six Years Later” (2014) 27 
Can J Admin L & Prac 173 at 175.  
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potential legitimacy of administrative law (like the one articulated in the Baker 
paradigm) this concern appears to conflate the rule of law with maintaining the 
judiciary’s interpretive monopoly over questions of law.     
 
 
III. Recent Proposals to Renovate the Standard of Review 
 
If the cases from the past year are any indication, discontent with the Dunsmuir 
framework has reached another tipping point, when the Supreme Court seems 
primed to change the standard of review analysis yet again.86 The most telling piece 
of evidence is Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, a case which generated no 
less than four different proposals to change the standard of review analysis. But 
unfortunately, many of these proposals do not turn to L’Heureux-Dubé J’s opinion in 
Baker for inspiration; instead, they double-down on developing a set of more 
intricate conceptual definitions to resolve the current malaise.   
 
Like Dunsmuir, the Wilson case concerns an adjudicator’s decision to 
inquire about an employer’s reasons for terminating a non-unionized public sector 
employee. Besides rewriting the standard of review analysis in Dunsmuir, the 
Supreme Court held that the adjudicator’s decision to reinstate David Dunsmuir was 
unreasonable because the New Brunswick Department of Justice was legally entitled 
to dismiss him without holding a performance review. In doing so, the Court 
overturned thirty years of authority stretching back to Nicholson and Knight v Indian 
Head School Division No 19 by holding that “in the specific context of dismissal 
from public employment, disputes should be viewed through the lens of contract law 
rather than public law.”87 When subsequent litigants invited the Court to retrench the 
general duty of fairness in other regulatory contexts the Court demurred, stating that 
the Dunsmuir exception to the duty of fairness was “rather narrow.”88 Nevertheless, 
it raised the possibility that the private law of contract might further erode or exclude 
public law principles of fair process and reasoned justification in other cases 
involving the dismissal of non-unionized public employees.  
 
Therefore, when Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd (‘AECL’) terminated 
Joseph Wilson one year after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Dunsmuir, it 
set out to explore how far the common law of contract might limit or exclude 
administrative law protections against unjust dismissal under the Canada Labour 
Code.89 Wilson had been employed by AECL for approximately four and a half 
years – initially as a Senior Buyer/Order Administrator and later as a Procurement 
Supervisor. Despite having a clean disciplinary record, Wilson was dismissed 
summarily on 19 November 2009, at which time AECL offered him a severance 
                                                 
86 Stratas, supra note 1 at 2.  
 
87 Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 82.  
 
88 Canada (AG) v Mavi, 2011 SCC 30 at para 51, [2011] 2 SCR 504. 
 
89 Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985, c L-2 [Labour Code]. 
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package equivalent to 6 months’ salary. When Wilson filed a complaint for unjust 
dismissal under s. 240 of the Labour Code, it triggered the employer’s duty under s. 
242 to explain the reasons for its decision.90 Throughout the proceedings, Wilson 
maintained that his dismissal was, in fact, a form of reprisal to punish him for 
reporting corrupt procurement practices within his department.91 However, instead of 
disputing Wilson’s factual assertions or explaining its decision, AECL responded by 
letter stating simply that Wilson had been “terminated on a non-cause basis and was 
provided a generous severance package that exceeded the statutory requirements” 
under ss. 230 and 235 of the Labour Code.92 Unsatisfied with his employer’s 
response, Wilson requested the appointment of an adjudicator to determine whether 
his dismissal was “unjust” within the meaning of s 242.   
 
At the outset of the proceedings, the parties posed two questions for Stanley 
Schiff, a retired University of Toronto law professor with over forty years’ 
experience as an adjudicator under the Canada Labour Code.93 The first question 
was whether AECL could lawfully terminate Wilson’s employment on a without 
cause basis; the second was whether a generous severance package might constitute 
a just dismissal despite the absence of reasons. After considering the first question, 
Adjudicator Schiff held that AECL could not lawfully terminate Wilson on a without 
cause basis,94 because the Federal Court had declared in Redlon Agencies Ltd v 
Norgren that an employer “cannot avoid the operation of the unjust dismissal 
provisions by resorting to the severance payment provisions” in the Code.95 
Accordingly, he adjourned the proceeding with an invitation to the parties to 
negotiate a settlement. However, instead of pursuing negotiations with Wilson’s 
lawyer, AECL sought judicial review of his interlocutory ruling. Thus began 
Wilson’s four-year odyssey to the Supreme Court, which ultimately upheld Professor 
Schiff’s decision and sent the matter back so that another adjudicator could hear the 
parties’ submissions regarding the appropriate remedy.  
 
                                                 
90 Wilson, supra note 7 at paras 8–9. 
 
91 Ibid at para 10.  
 
92 Ibid at para 9. Section 230 of the Code provides a notice period or pay in lieu of notice of at least two 
weeks for employees who have completed three consecutive months of employment; and section 235 
states that employees who have completed twelve consecutive months of employment are entitled to 
severance pay equivalent to the greater amount of two days wages for each year of continuous 
employment or five days wages.  
 
93 Stanley Schiff is Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Toronto and author of “Labour Arbitration 
Procedures”, a Draft Study on Judicial Review of Labour Arbitration in Canada (Task Force on Labour 
Relations, Office of the Privy Council 1968). Professor Schiff began serving as an adjudicator under the 
Canada Labour Code in 1970, and Wilson would be the final decision he delivered in that capacity. His 
earliest reported decision is Re United Steelworkers and TMX Watches of Canada Ltd, [1970] CLAD No 
73.  
 
94 Wilson, supra note 7 at para 13.  
 
95 Redlon Agencies Ltd v Norgren, 2005 FC 804 at para 39, 139 ACWS (3d) 1018 [Redlon].   
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The parties raised two issues on judicial review. The first was whether 
AECL’s application for judicial review of the adjudicator’s decision was premature; 
the second was whether the adjudicator’s decision was unreasonable.96 At least at 
this stage in the proceedings, there was no dispute that the proper standard of review 
was reasonableness, because both parties had agreed that an adjudicator’s decision 
regarding the interpretation of the enabling legislation in general (and the unjust 
dismissal provisions in particular) warranted a degree of judicial deference.  
 
Despite acknowledging that “courts discourage the breaking up of 
proceedings into discrete parcels and encourage the parties to finish their business in 
the tribunal below before coming to court,”97 O’Reilly J held that it was nevertheless 
permissible for AECL to seek judicial review because the adjudicator “had made a 
final determination on the substance of the matter before him.”98 However, he 
neglected to mention that s. 243 of the Code contains privative clause, which 
prohibits courts from entertaining an application “to question, review, prohibit or 
restrain an adjudicator in any proceedings of the adjudicator under section 242.”99 
While a privative clause might not be a conclusive factor when determining the 
standard of review, it clearly directed the Federal Court to refrain from intervening 
until the adjudicator had rendered a decision on the appropriate remedy.  
 
On the second issue, both parties agreed that reasonableness was the 
appropriate standard of review, and O’Reilly J concluded that Professor Schiff’s 
decision was unreasonable.100 In O’Reilly J’s view, the adjudicator had 
“unreasonably relied on Redlon for the proposition that employers governed by the 
CLC must show just cause for all dismissals.”101 Given the Federal Court’s explicit 
statement in Redlon that an employer “cannot avoid the operation of the unjust 
dismissal provisions by resorting to the severance payment provisions,” one might 
have been tempted to conclude the adjudicator’s decision was rationally defensible in 
light of the reasoning expressed in that case.102 Nevertheless, O’Reilly J asserted that 
“[a]n employer can dismiss an employee without cause so long as it gives notice or 
                                                 
96 Wilson and Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, Re, 2013 FC 733 at paras 10, 18, 230 ACWS (3d) 6 [Re 
Wilson and Atomic Energy].  
 
97 Ibid at para 12.  
 
98 Ibid at para 15.  
 
99 Section 243 of the Labour Code, supra note 89, states: 
243(1) Every order of an adjudicator appointed under subsection 242(1) is final and 
shall not be questioned or reviewed in any court.  
(2) No order shall be made, process entered or proceeding taken in any court, 
whether by way of injunction, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto or otherwise, to 
question, review, prohibit or restrain an adjudicator in any proceedings of the 
adjudicator under section 242.  
 
100 Re Wilson and Atomic Energy, supra note 96 at para 40.  
 
101 Ibid at para 26.  
 
102 Redlon, supra note 95 at para 39.  
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severance pay.”103 While he recognized that an employee retained the right to 
complain that his termination was unjust under s. 240, he held that a “without cause” 
dismissal was not ipso facto unjust because such an inference “would fail to take 
account of the clear remedies provided in ss. 230 and 235 (i.e. notice and severance) 
for persons dismissed without cause.”104 The upshot of O’Reilly J’s reasoning is that 
as long as an employer provides sufficient monetary severance accompanied by pro 
forma “without cause” statement which is devoid of malice, discriminatory animus, 
or reprisal, they might avoid an unjust dismissal inquiry under s. 242 of the Labour 
Code. Practically speaking, O’Reilly J’s interpretation of the Labour Code would 
enable public employers to dismiss employees arbitrarily – even for no reason at all 
– so long as they provided adequate notice and severance.   
 
A month after the decision, AECL’s lawyer praised O’Reilly J’s decision in 
the Lawyers Weekly, saying that it would have a “monumental impact on federally 
regulated employers and their non-unionized staff,” because “arbitrators have 
uniformly held that the phrase ‘unjust dismissal’ means an employer can only 
terminate an employee for just cause, such as for reasons of misconduct, 
incompetence or permanent incapacity.”105 In the same column, Professor Michael 
Lynk from the University of Western Ontario (a former labour lawyer and CLC 
arbitrator), stated that “[t]his is a break with very consistent arbitral and judicial case 
law that has provided non-unionized workers in the federal sector with broad rights 
protections and remedies akin to what they would find in a collective agreement.”106 
When cast in this light, O’Reilly J’s ruling that the adjudicator’s decision was 
unreasonable seems ironic: it asserts that the rule of law entitled the court to resolve 
a stalemate between conflicting lines of administrative law when, in fact, experts in 
the field of employment law generally agreed that the Labour Code required 
employers to explain their decisions to dismiss non-unionized employees instead of 
terminating them summarily.       
 
Despite the fact that both parties and a Federal Court justice all agreed that the 
Adjudicator’s decision should be reviewed on a reasonableness standard, the case 
quickly devolved into a protracted debate about the appropriate standard of review. 
In subsequent legal proceedings, twelve different justices of the Federal Court of 
Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada went on at length about different proposals to 
renovate the standard of review analysis, but expended relatively little effort on 
understanding the Adjudicator’s decision on its own terms. In what follows, I will 
attempt to separate the different camps in this ongoing debate, and examine the 
different proposals for reforming the standard of review analysis.   
 
                                                 
103 Re Wilson and Atomic Energy, supra note 96 at para 35.  
 
104 Ibid at para 37.  
 
105 Christopher Guly, “Court makes ‘game-changing’ decision on employees: ‘No basis’ for contention 
Labour Code demands dismissals with cause, judge rules” (16 August 2013) 33(14) The Lawyers Weekly.   
 
106 Ibid. See also Reagan Ruslim, “Unjust Dismissal the Canada Labour Code: New Law, Old Statute” 
(2014) 5 UWO J Legal Stud 3.  
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(a) Judicial Review is a Matter of Degree 
 
The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed Wilson’s appeal on both grounds. Writing 
for the Court, Stratas JA conceded that litigants should only seek judicial review 
after exhausting the administrative process, but noted that this principle was 
attenuated in “rare cases where the effect of an interlocutory decision on the 
applicant is so immediate and drastic that the Court’s concern about the rule of law is 
aroused.”107 Like O’Reilly J, Stratas JA did not mention that the adjudicator’s 
decision and continuing jurisdiction regarding the appropriate remedy was protected 
by a privative clause. Later in his reasons, Stratas JA suggested that the adjudicator 
had bifurcated the proceedings intentionally so as to enable the Federal Court to 
settle “once and for all” the legal question about whether an employer could lawfully 
terminate on a without cause basis.108 But because the adjudicator expressly rested 
his decision on Redlon, he did not appear to be casting about for another Federal 
Court ruling on the issue; if anything, he seemed to be encouraging the parties to 
negotiate a settlement, instead of having him impose one that might not be to either’s 
liking. In this respect, the adjudicator was likely drawing upon 40 years of 
experience serving as a labour adjudicator when he adjourned the hearing.  
 
After dispensing with Wilson’s first ground of appeal, Stratas JA considered 
the standard of review, and held (surprisingly) that O’Reilly J had erred in applying 
the reasonableness standard. After noting that the Court was not bound by the 
parties’ agreement, Stratas JA called it an “unusual case”109 in which “the current 
state of adjudicator’s jurisprudence is one of persistent discord.”110 Accordingly, 
Stratas JA held “the rule of law concern predominates…and warrants this Court 
intervening to end the discord and determine the legal point once and for all.”111 To 
support his conclusion, he noted that Dunsmuir contemplated correctness review for 
questions of law which are of central importance to the legal system and outside the 
expertise of the decision-maker.112 In the alternative, he asserted that interpretation 
of the relevant Labour Code provisions required “relatively little specialized labour 
insight,” meaning that even if he had applied the reasonableness standard the 
adjudicator was entitled to “only a narrow margin of appreciation” relative to the 
Court’s interpretation of the Labour Code.113 But regardless of which standard 
applied, Stratas JA held that O’Reilly J’s interpretation of the Labour Code, which 
permitted “without cause” dismissals, was correct and therefore declined to 
intervene.  
                                                 
107 Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, 2015 FCA 17 at para 33, 249 ACWS (3d) 347.  
 
108 Ibid at para 39.  
 
109 Ibid at paras 43–46. 
 
110 Ibid at para 52.  
 
111 Ibid at para 55.   
 
112 Ibid at para 56. 
 
113 Ibid at para 58. 
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Stratas JA’s opinion weaves together two slightly different strands of 
argument, both of which merit further analysis. The first is that in cases where a 
reviewing court concludes that in cases where administrative interpretations of law 
conflict, it is entitled to engage in correctness review so as to settle the controversy 
“once and for all.” This line of reasoning would later form the basis for Côté and 
Brown JJ’s dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court, which I will address at greater 
length below.114  
 
The second argument, which has become Stratas JA’s trademark over the 
past few years, is that attempts to draw a sharp distinction between different 
standards of review are misplaced, because judicial review is essentially a matter of 
degree.115 This line of reasoning emphasizes post-Dunsmuir signals from the 
Supreme Court that the reasonableness standard of review “takes its colour from the 
context.”116 But it also harkens back to Iacobucci J’s pre-Dunsmuir notion that there 
is a “spectrum” of review which prescribes correctness review for questions of 
law,117 and Sopinka J’s suggestion in CAIMAW v Paccar that the reasonableness 
refers to “a logical relationship between the grounds of the decision and the premises 
thought by the court to be true.”118  
 
In this vein, Stratas JA asserts in both ex cathedra opinions and extra-
judicial commentary that the purpose of reasonableness review is to verify whether 
an administrative decision falls within a range of “acceptability and defensibility” on 
the facts and the law119 that widens or narrows depending upon the nature of the 
issues involved. Thus, it is of paramount importance for reviewing courts to establish 
the relevant margin of appreciation at the outset before moving on to consider the 
procedural or substantive attributes of the decision under review. In cases where 
legislation “signals that the standard of review should be correctness” by providing a 
right of appeal,120 giving judges the power to certify a question of law for 
                                                 
114 See 140–142, below. 
 
115 See e.g. First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada v Canada (AG), 2013 FCA 75, 226 
ACWS (3d) 813 [First Nations Child and Family Caring Society]. For academic commentary on Stratas 
JA’s opinion in that case, see Paul Daly, “Unreasonable Interpretations of Law” (2014) 66 SCLR (2d) 
233.  
 
116 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 59, [2009] 1 SCR 339; Catalyst 
Paper Corp v North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2 at paras 17–18, [2012] 1 SCR 5. 
 
117 Southam, supra note 49 at para 30, 54.  
 
118 Paccar, supra note 47 at 1017–18: 
Reasonableness is not a quality that exists in isolation. When a court says that a 
decision under review is “reasonable” or “patently unreasonable” it is making a 
statement about the logical relationship between the grounds of the decision and the 
premises thought by the court to be true. Without the reference point of an opinion 
(if not a conclusion) on the merits, such a relative statement cannot be made. 
 
119 Stratas, supra note 1 at 16. See also First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, supra note 115 at 
para 12. 
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consideration by an appellate court,121 or setting out “recipes…that must be followed 
or other constraining words,”122 Stratas JA asserts that a reviewing court should 
allow an administrative decision-maker little or no margin of appreciation. By 
contrast, in cases which turn on “factual appreciation, fact-based discretions, 
administrative policies, or specialized experience and expertise not shared by the 
reviewing court on the particular point in issue,” he asserts that administrative 
decision-makers enjoy a relatively wide margin of appreciation.123 But the bottom 
line seems to be an inverse correlation between the degree to which an administrative 
decision involves questions of law (especially statutory provisions and common law 
doctrine)124 and the degree to which a court will defer to an administrative decision, 
because “[l]egal matters, as opposed to factual or policy matters, admit of fewer 
possible, acceptable outcomes.”125  
 
In order to throw Stratas JA’s theory into stark relief, it is worth comparing 
the different margins of appreciation he employed in Delios v Canada (Attorney 
General) with the one he applied in Wilson.126 In Delios, a case concerning the 
interpretation of collective agreement provisions establishing an employee’s paid 
leave entitlement, Stratas JA held that the adjudicator was entitled to a “wide margin 
of appreciation” because “labour adjudicators’ decisions are often protected by 
privative clauses” and:127 
 
interpretations of collective agreement provisions involve elements of 
factual appreciation, specialization and expertise concerning collective 
agreements, the disputes that arise under them, the negotiations that lead 
up to them and, more broadly, how the management-labour dynamic 
swirling around them plays out in various circumstances.   
 
                                                                                                                   
120 On this point, Stratas JA approves of Slatter JA’s decision in Edmonton East, supra note 7, in which he 
held that a statutory right of appeal implies review on a correctness standard.   
 
121 Stratas, supra note 1 at 4–5. See also Kanthasamy v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
2014 FCA 113 at paras 30–37, 372 DLR (4th) 539.  
 
122 Stratas, supra note 1 at 15. See also Canada (Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities) v 
Farwaha, 2014 FCA 56 at para 91, 238 ACWS (3d) 282; Canada (AG) v Boogaard, 2015 FCA 150 at 
para 43, 87 Admin LR (4th) 175; Canada (AG) v Almon Equipment Limited, 2010 FCA 193 at para 53, 
[2011] 4 FCR 203. 
 
123 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, supra note 115 at para 14; Forest Ethics Advocacy 
Association v Canada (National Energy Board), 2014 FCA 245 at para 82, 246 ACWS (3d) 191. 
 
124 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada, supra note 115 at paras 14–15; Canada 
(AG) v Abraham, 2012 FCA 266 at para 45, [2013] 1 CTC 69 [Abraham]; Paradis Honey Ltd v Canada, 
2015 FCA 89 at para 136, 382 DLR (4th) 720.  
 
125 Abraham, supra note 124 at para 45; Hupacasath First Nation v Canada (AG), 2015 FCA 4 at para 66, 
379 DLR (4th) 737. 
 
126 Delios v Canada (AG), 2015 FCA 117, 100 Admin LR (5th) 301.   
 
127 Ibid at paras 20–21.  
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By contrast, in Wilson Stratas JA does not mention the relevance of the privative 
clause and noted that “the statutory interpretation point before us involves relatively 
little specialized labour insight beyond the regular means the courts have at hand 
when interpreting a statutory provision.”128 Without further explanation, it is 
certainly debatable whether the margin of appreciation should vary depending on 
whether a labour adjudicator is interpreting collective agreement provisions 
regarding paid-leave entitlements as opposed to unjust dismissal provisions in the 
Labour Code. The unavoidable inference from cases like Delios, Wilson and others 
is that whenever administrative officials interpret legislation, Stratas JA’s analysis 
gravitates towards correctness review or, alternatively, a form of deference which is 
indistinguishable from it. 
 
 
(b) Judicial Review Means Reasonable Pluralism…Unless There’s Only One 
Right Answer 
 
When framed in this way, Stratas JA’s proposal for reform is only one small step 
removed from the doctrine of jurisdictional error, in which judges are entitled to 
review questions of law on a correctness standard. At most, he is prepared to allow 
administrative officials a narrow margin of appreciation when interpreting 
legislation, but it is doubtful whether this makes any practical difference a case like 
Wilson because “whether we conduct reasonableness review or correctness review, 
the outcome of the appeal would be the same.”129 But such an approach discounts the 
fact that Parliament empowered adjudicators to interpret and apply the Labour Code, 
and the fact that the adjudicator in this case seemed to be exercising that power in a 
way which was rationally defensible in light of the Labour Code’s objectives, 
namely to resolve employment disputes in an efficient, but conciliatory, manner. 
Finally, it seems to conflict with the landmark ruling in cases like CUPE and Baker 
that judges should defer to administrative interpretations of broadly worded statutory 
provisions, provided they are “rationally supported by the relevant legislation.”130  
 
In the Supreme Court, a majority led by Abella J concluded that the Federal 
Court of Appeal had erred in applying the correctness standard of review. On the 
standard of review issue, Abella J pointed out that both parties had agreed that the 
Adjudicator’s decision should be reviewed on a reasonableness standard. But she 
also relied on two recent Supreme Court decisions – Dunsmuir and Nor-Man 
Regional Health Authority Inc v Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals 
– as authority for the proposition that the decisions of labour adjudicators and 
arbitrators should generally be afforded a significant degree of deference.131 Abella 
                                                 
128 Re Wilson and Atomic Energy, supra note 96 at para 58.  
 
129 Ibid at para 58.  
 
130 CUPE, supra note 42 at 237.  
 
131 Wilson, supra note 7 at para 15. In another case from 2015, Kathasamy, supra note 7 the Supreme 
Court rejected Stratas JA’s suggestion that the Federal Court of Appeal should review certified questions 
of law on a correctness standard.  
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J’s reliance on these two cases is noteworthy, because they both apply the more 
deferential standard of review to administrative interpretations of enabling legislation 
(Dunsmuir) and common law doctrine (Nor-Man), which undercuts the assertion that 
the degree of judicial deference narrows as the quotient of law involved in an 
administrative decision increases. And in another case from 2015, Kanthasamy v 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), Abella J authored another majority opinion 
which rejected the suggestion that the correctness standard ought to apply to cases in 
which a Federal Court had certified a question of law for consideration by the 
Federal Court of Appeal.132 Therefore, at least to this point the Supreme Court is not 
inclined to adopt Stratas JA’s proposal for renovating the standard of review 
analysis. To underline this point in Wilson, Abella J stated that an “attempt to 
calibrate reasonableness by applying a potentially indeterminate number of varying 
degrees of deference” was unhelpful, because it would further complicate an area of 
law was “in need of greater simplicity.”133  
 
Regarding the Adjudicator’s decision in Wilson, Abella J concluded that it 
was reasonable, and therefore sent the matter back for a decision regarding the 
appropriate remedy. However, it remains unclear whether Abella J upheld the 
decision simply because she agreed with the Adjudicator or whether she thought the 
Adjudicator’s had articulated a reasonable legal justification for his decision. When 
it came time to apply the reasonableness standard, Abella J stated:134 
 
The issue here is whether the Adjudicator’s interpretation of ss 240 to 246 
of the Code was reasonable. The text, the context, the statements of the 
Minister when the legislation was introduced, and the views of the 
overwhelming majority of arbitrators and labour law scholars, confirm that 
the entire purpose of the statutory scheme was to ensure that non-
unionized federal employees would be entitled to protection from being 
dismissed without cause under Part III of the Code. The alternative 
approach of severance pay in lieu falls outside the range of “possible, 
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law” 
because it completely undermines this purpose by permitting employers, at 
their option, to deprive employees of the full remedial package Parliament 
created for them. The rights of employees should be based on what 
Parliament intended, not on the idiosyncratic view of the individual 
employer or adjudicator.  
 
Adjudicator Schiff’s decision was, therefore, reasonable. 
 
This passage suggests that, instead of beginning with an attempt to understand the 
Adjudicator’s reasons on their own terms, Abella J immediately applied traditional 
canons of statutory construction by engaging in a holistic analysis of the text, 
                                                 
132 Kanthasamy, supra note 7 at paras 42–44.   
 
133 Wilson, supra note 7 at para 18.  
 
134 Ibid at paras 39–40.  
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context, and legislative history in order to determine Parliamentary intent.135 Once 
she concluded that Parliament had not intended to allow employers to dismiss on a 
without cause basis, she considered the Adjudicator’s decision to be reasonable 
because he arrived at the same outcome. Thus, despite disagreeing about the 
appropriate standard of review, Abella J and Stratas JA agreed that the legality of the 
Adjudicator’s decision should be assessed according to a reviewing judge’s 
understanding of the Labour Code –they just parted ways over how to interpret the 
statute.136   
 
The problem with this approach to reasonableness review is that it only 
pays lip service to the idea that administrative law has a meaningful impact on 
judicial reasoning about what the law requires. If one unpacks the reasonableness 
standard in this way, then any quibbling over the standard of review seems both 
vacuous and misleading, because judges can defer by first determining how the 
legislation should be interpreted and then verifying that the administrative decision-
maker construed the legislation in substantially the same terms.    
 
While Abella J could have rested at this point, she nevertheless offered 
another proposal for reforming the standard of review analysis in obiter dicta.137 She 
began by noting that the Dunsmuir framework had fallen short of its objectives, 
because “where once the confusion was over the difference between patent 
unreasonableness and reasonableness simpliciter, we now find ourselves struggling 
over the different between reasonableness and correctness.”138 The consequence of 
this confusion was that judges and counsel engaged in protracted “terminological 
battles regarding the standard of review at the outset of judicial review, with 
relatively little regard for the merits of a particular administrative decision.139 Then, 
after noting several academic critiques of the Dunsmuir framework by leading 
administrative scholars, she raised the prospect of adopting a universal standard of 
reasonableness, saying:140 
 
Nothing Dunsmuir says about the rule of law suggests that constitutional 
compliance dictates how many standards are required. The only 
requirement, in fact, is that there be judicial review in order to ensure, in 
particular that decision-makers do not exercise authority they do not have. 
I see nothing in its elaboration of rule of law principles that precludes the 
adoption of a single standard of review, so long as it accommodates the 
                                                 
135 Another prominent example of this reasoning is Canada (AG) v Mowat, 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 SCR 
471, a case that is frequently held up as an example of disguised correctness review. See Mullan, 
“Unresolved Issues”, supra note 46 at 58–59; Matthew Lewans, “Deference and Reasonableness Since 
Dunsmuir” (2012) 38 Queen’s LJ 59 at 90–92.  
 
136 Jones, supra note 9 at 38.  
 
137 Wilson, supra note 7 at para 19. 
 
138 Ibid at para 26.  
 
139 Ibid at para 25. 
 
140 Ibid at para 31.  
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ability to continue to protect both deference and the possibility of a single 
answer where the rule of law demands it, as in the four categories singled 
out for correctness review.  
 
So instead of Stratas JA’s proposal to draw more fine-grained distinctions regarding 
varying margins of appreciation, Abella J proposes to collapse different standards of 
review into one universal reasonableness standard which can accommodate a 
plurality of reasonable administrative decisions…unless a reviewing court concludes 
there is only one right answer.141 
 
While moving to a universal standard of reasonableness might avoid 
protracted, unproductive handwringing over which standard of review to apply, 
defining the reasonableness in these terms will only render the application of that 
standard more fraught with contradiction. At best, Abella J’s proposal might avoid 
problems associated with applying different standards of review to multiple issues 
within the same administrative decision.142 But because the reasonableness standard 
is construed as requiring deferential assessment of administrative reasons unless the 
court thinks there is only one correct outcome, there is a substantial risk that the “one 
right answer” qualification will simply become an “analytical Trojan Horse that 
invites correctness review under the guise of reasonableness analysis.”143 As the 
history of judicial review amply demonstrates, judges are prone to overreaching their 
constitutional role by asserting there is only one right answer on questions of 
statutory interpretation, even when enabling legislation is cast in relatively general 
terms and assigns authority to administrative officials to resolve interpretive 
disputes. In those cases, where a court is convinced that an administrative decision 
offends the principle of legality, it should at least explain why that decision is unfair 
or cannot be rationally supported in light of the relevant legal principles.  
 
Finally, it is revealing that Abella J ’s proposal would not have made any 
difference on the way the Wilson case unfolded. Despite applying the reasonableness 
standard at first instance, O’Reilly J held that the Adjudicator’s decision was 
unreasonable because it conflicted with what he deemed to be a proper reading of the 
Labour Code (i.e. that it entitled AECL to dismiss Wilson on a without cause basis). 
Stratas JA, for his part, thought it made no difference whether the standard of review 
was correctness or reasonableness, but ultimately agreed with O’Reilly J’s general 
interpretation of the Labour Code. While Abella J held that the Federal Court of 
Appeal applied the wrong standard of review, she essentially engaged in the same 
exercise, because she measured the legality of the Adjudicator’s decision against her 
own interpretation of the Labour Code. Thus, the apparent disagreement between 
O’Reilly J, Stratas JA, and Abella J over the appropriate standard of review masks 
                                                 
141 British Columbia (Securities Commission) v McLean, 2013 SCC 67 at paras 37–38, [2013] 3 SCR 895. 
For an excellent critique of the ‘one right answer’ gloss on reasonableness review, see Falzon, supra note 
9.  
 
142 See, e.g. Canadian Broadcasting Corp v SODRAC 2003 Inc, 2015 SCC 57, [2015] 3 SCR 615.  
 
143 Falzon, supra note 9 at 160. 
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the fact that they all essentially believed there was one right answer to the question 
posed to the Adjudicator – they just disagreed about what that one right answer was. 
But by approaching judicial review in this way, all three judges effectively treat the 
Adjudicator’s decision as an ephemeral piece of advice instead of a piece of 
administrative law which merits judicial respect. This makes one wonder whether all 
this talk about deference is merely a rhetorical veneer designed to deflect concerns 
about judicial overreach.  
 
 
(c) Let Sleeping Dogs Lie 
 
Perhaps one should not put too much stock in Abella J’s proposal just yet, because 
the five other five concurring justices distanced themselves from her obiter 
comments. While McLachlin CJ (along with Karakatsanis, Wagner, and Gascon JJ, 
concurring) appreciated Abella J’s “efforts to stimulate a discussion on how to 
clarify or simplify our standard of review jurisprudence to better promote certainty 
and predictability,” she said she was “not prepared to endorse any particular proposal 
to redraw our current standard of review framework at this time.”144 Similarly, while 
Cromwell J agreed that “developing new and apparently unlimited numbers of 
gradations of reasonableness review”145 would not improve matters, he cautioned 
that “our standard of review jurisprudence does not need yet another overhaul.”146 
Although many observers expected the Court to discuss Abella J’s proposal in 
Edmonton (City) v Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd, it ultimately 
deferred that discussion to a later date. Writing for a bare majority, Karakatsanis J 
noted in that case that the day for reforming the standard of review analysis “has not 
come, but it may be approaching,” which suggests that it may take up the cudgel 
again in the coming year.147   
 
While it is difficult to speculate about where the Supreme Court might turn 
next, the prevailing sense of confusion regarding the standard of review is palpable. 
As I suggested earlier, the problems associated with the categorical approach to the 
standard of review in Dunsmuir continue to generate considerable litigation. Despite 
its attempt to signal a preference for reasonableness review in all cases where an 
administrative agency is interpreting its home statute, this has not deterred litigants 
and appellate courts from testing the limits of correctness review. In Wilson, the 
Federal Court of Appeal expanded correctness review to include situations where a 
reviewing court perceives a rift in administrative law; and in Edmonton East, the 
Alberta Court of Appeal expanded correctness review to cases where the enabling 
legislation includes a statutory right of appeal.148 Despite ample case law from the 
                                                 
144 Wilson, supra note 7 at para 70.  
 
145 Ibid at para 73. 
 
146 Ibid at para 72.  
 
147 Edmonton East, supra note 7 at para 20.  
 
148 Re Wilson and Atomic Energy, supra note 96 at para 39; Edmonton East, supra note 7 at para 24.  
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Supreme Court that the appropriate standard of review is reasonableness in both 
scenarios,149 both appellate courts interpreted Dunsmuir as authorizing correctness 
oversight. And as long as litigants perceive they might find a receptive audience for 
expanding Dunsmuir’s categories of correctness review, even in cases concerning the 
interpretation of an administrator’s home statute, they will continue to test the 
Supreme Court’s resolve regarding administrative interpretations of law.  
 
Nevertheless, the majority’s reasoning in Edmonton East provides a 
glimmer of hope that reengagement with the underlying principles of fairness and 
reasonable justification might yet provide helpful guidance about how to verify the 
legality of an administrative decision without embarking on a quixotic quest to 
determine the correct outcome to the question posed to the primary decision-maker. 
The case concerned a decision of the Edmonton Assessment Review Board to 
increase the assessed value of a shopping mall. The mall had originally been 
assessed as having a value of $31 million, which the owner challenged on the 
grounds that it exceeded the market value of the property and/or was inequitable in 
light of the assessed value of similar properties. However, while preparing for the 
hearing, the municipality discovered that the mall had been mistakenly classified as a 
“community centre,” which meant that its rental value had been grossly undervalued. 
The City informed the owner of its mistake, and indicated that it would ask the 
Assessment Review Board to increase the assessed value of the property at the 
appeal hearing. During the hearing, counsel for the property owner conceded that the 
Board had the legal authority to increase the assessed value of the property, because 
the enabling legislation gave it the power to “make a change to an assessment roll or 
tax roll.”150 However, when the Board increased the assessed value of the property, 
the owner sought leave to appeal to the Court of Queen’s Bench on “a question of 
law or jurisdiction of sufficient importance” to warrant judicial intervention.151  
 
At first instance, Rooke ACJ held that the appropriate standard of review 
was correctness, because the Board’s decision involved a jurisdictional question 
about whether it could increase an assessment that had been challenged by a property 
owner.152 But the Alberta Court of Appeal (perhaps sensing that the parameters of 
“jurisdictional error” had waned since Dunsmuir),153 held that the correctness 
standard applied because the statutory right of appeal implied that “the Legislature 
clearly intended that the administrative decision maker make the initial decision, 
                                                 
149 See, e.g. Domtar Inc v Quebec (Commission d’appel en matière de lesions professionelles), [1993] 2 
SCR 756, 105 DLR (4th) 385; Pezim, supra note 48; Southam, supra note 49; Smith v Alliance Pipeline 
Ltd, 2011 SCC 7, [2011] 1 SCR 160; Ontario (Energy Board) v Ontario Power Generation Inc, 2015 SCC 
45, [2015] 3 SCR 147; ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd v Alberta (Utility Commission), 2015 SCC 45, [2015] 
3 SCR 219.  
 
150 Municipal Government Act, RSA 2000, c M-26, s 467.  
 
151 Ibid at s 470(5).   
 
152 Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd v Edmonton (City), 2013 ABQB 526, 570 AR 208. 
 
153 See supra note 84.  
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subject to review by the court.”154 In doing so, it proposed to expand Dunsmuir’s 
categories of correctness review to include cases where an administrative decision 
was subject to a statutory right of appeal,155 and cited the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Tervita Corp v Canada (Commissioner of Competition) as authority for 
this addendum.156 
 
In a highly anticipated decision, the Supreme Court restored the Board’s 
decision by a narrow 5-4 margin. In her majority opinion, Karakatsanis J applied 
what she took to be the predominant approach to judicial review in the post-
Dunsmuir era. After briefly reviewing the Board’s powers under the Municipal 
Government Act, including its statutory power to “change” an assessment, 
Karakatsanis J held that a presumption of deference applied so as to convey judicial 
respect for “the principle of legislative supremacy and the choice made to delegate 
decision making to a tribunal” and foster access to justice administered by a “flexible 
and expert tribunal.”157 Moreover, she quickly disposed of the submission that the 
Board’s decision involved a jurisdictional question, by saying that this category had 
been narrowly construed in recent years, and reiterating that the Board’s 
interpretation of its home statute merited a deferential standard of review.158 In 
response to the Court of Appeal’s suggestion that a statutory right of appeal should 
be construed as signaling the legislature’s preference for correctness oversight, 
Karakatsanis J noted that such a move conflicted with “strong jurisprudence from 
this Court.”159  
  
But the most interesting aspect of Karakatsanis J’s decision concerns her 
method of assessing whether the Board’s decision was reasonably justified. Instead 
of applying ordinary canons of statutory construction to determine directly whether 
the legislation empowered the Board to increase the property’s assessed value, she 
set out to verify “the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within 
the decision-making process.”160 She began by noting that the City had apprised the 
owner that it was going to ask the Board to increase the assessed value, and the 
owner had filed lengthy submissions in response. More importantly, Karakatsanis J 
highlighted how the property owner’s counsel had conceded at the initial Board 
hearing that the enabling legislation empowered the Board to “change” to the 
assessment roll, which meant it had the power to increase the assessed value. 
                                                 
154 Edmonton East, supra note 7 at para 24.  
 
155 Ibid.  
 
156 Edmonton East, supra note 7 at para 25, citing Tervita Corp v Canada (Commissioner of Competition), 
2015 SCC 3, [2015] 1 SCR 161.  
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Therefore, the Board’s decision-making process had clearly been fair and 
transparent.161  
 
But was the Board’s decision reasonable in light of the available evidence 
and relevant law? On this point, Karakatsanis J admitted that when an administrative 
decision-maker fails to give reasons, “it makes the task of determining the 
justification and intelligibility of the decision more challenging.”162 While she 
conceded that complete administrative silence would be a reviewable in cases where 
the duty of fairness required “some form of reasons,” she noted that the duty to 
provide reasons was not a universal requirement.163 Thus, she asserted that “when a 
tribunal’s failure to provide any reasons does not breach procedural fairness, the 
reviewing court may consider the reasons ‘which could be offered’ in support of the 
decision,” including (but not limited to) existing administrative law which articulates 
reasons which lend support for the decision under review.164 After reiterating that the 
Board had treated the property owner fairly by inviting submissions on whether the 
Board had the power to increase the initial assessment, Karakatsanis J proceeded to 
review the overarching objectives of the statute, specific statutory provisions, and 
existing administrative law regarding the purpose and function of the Assessment 
Review Board in order to verify whether the Board’s decision was rationally 
defensible. She pointed out that the language of the specific provision gave the 
Board relatively broad powers to “change” an assessment in order to achieve the 
statutory objective of ensuring that properties are assessed in a fair and equitable 
manner.165 Furthermore, she noted a prior decision of the Alberta Municipal 
Government Board, which had interpreted the provision as enabling the Assessment 
Review Board to increase or decrease an assessment in order to arrive at a fair and 
equitable assessment.166 Therefore, even though she did not define the true meaning 
of s. 467 of the Municipal Government Act, Karakatsanis J was nevertheless able to 
verify that the Board’s decision was reasonable because its interpretation was 
“consistent with the ordinary meaning of ‘change’ and the overarching policy goal of 
the MGA, to ensure assessments are correct, fair and equitable.”167 
 
What is most remarkable about Karakatsanis J’s opinion is the attempt to 
articulate an integrated account reasonableness review – one which draws a 
connection between judicial deference, fair process, and substantive review. The 
starting point is a reminder that the purpose of judicial review is to ensure the 
                                                 
161 Edmonton East, supra note 7 at paras 36–40.  
 
162 Ibid at para 36.  
 
163 Ibid at para 37; as L’Heureux-Dubé J noted in Baker, supra note 3 at para 43 “in certain circumstances, 
the duty of procedural fairness will require the provision of a written explanation for a decision.”  
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legality of an administrative decision, rather than to prioritize judicial interpretations 
of law. The second point is that the legality of an administrative decision depends 
partially on whether a party has been given an opportunity to provide submissions 
regarding how the law should be applied in light of the particular facts and 
circumstances. Finally, the legality of an administrative decision depends on whether 
it can be rationally defended in light of the relevant underlying principles of the 
relevant legal framework for the decision. When viewed in this way, Karakatsanis 
J’s opinion provides a robust, but nuanced, approach to reasonableness review. As in 
Baker, Karakatsanis J leaves aside the question whether the decision under review 
concerns a question or issue which qualifies for judicial deference in the abstract, 
and instead asks whether the decision-maker had been attentive to the litigant’s 
submissions and had provided a decision which was capable of being justified in 
light of relevant law (including administrative law on the subject).  
 
Nevertheless, because Karakatsanis J held that the Board was not required to 
provide reasons and instead opted to supplement the Board’s decision with reasons 
which might have been offered in support of the decision, her decision does not 
vindicate the values articulated in Baker – especially the value of enabling a party 
“to see that the applicable issues have been carefully considered.”168 By affirming 
the proposition that judges can consider reasons “which could be offered” (but were 
not, in fact, offered by the decision-maker),169 Karakatsanis J’s opinion provides a 
perverse incentive for decision-makers to issue conclusions without a supporting 
legal rationale in the hopes that a reviewing court might rectify their omission. From 
an evaluative perspective – one that takes its cues from Baker – the duty to provide 
reasons is significant because it serves to verify that an administrative authority is 
“exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of 
the rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the fundamental values of 
Canadian society, and the principles of the Charter.”170 Therefore, one hopes that the 
Court will revisit this issue in greater depth in future cases, because it will likely 
yield important insights about the connection between judicial deference and the 
fundamental values which legitimate administrative decisions and warrant judicial 
respect.171  
 
 
(d) The Rule of Law Requires Correctness Review   
 
Up to this point, it appears that although judges generally acknowledge that they 
should defer to administrative decisions, they often renege on that commitment 
because they remain wedded (consciously or otherwise) to the formalist notion that 
                                                 
168 Baker, supra note 3 at para 39.  
 
169 Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 79 at paras 51–53.  
 
170 Baker, supra note 3 at para 56.  
 
171 For a more thorough scholarly analysis of this connection, see Dyzenhaus & Fox-Decent, supra note 4 
at 218–238.  
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questions of law should generally be determined by the judiciary.172 Sometimes this 
tendency is couched in terms of allowing administrative officials a narrow margin of 
appreciation when interpreting legislation and common law principles; sometimes it 
confuses how judges assess the reasonableness of an administrative decision, even to 
the point of saying that judges should defer to administrative decisions unless they 
believe there is only one right answer. But the last proposal for reforming the law of 
judicial review seeks to clarify it by dispensing with the pretense of judicial 
deference to administrative decisions on matters of substance altogether.  
 
Recall that when the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in 
Wilson, Stratas JA held that the court should review the Adjudicator’s decision on a 
correctness standard because “the current state of adjudicators jurisprudence is one 
of persistent discord.”173 Therefore, despite recognizing that “Parliament has vested 
jurisdiction in adjudicators under the Code to decide questions of statutory 
interpretation” Stratas JA concluded that “the rule of law concern predominates in 
this case and warrants this Court intervening to end the discord and determine the 
legal point once and for all. We have to act as a tie-breaker.”174 To support this 
conclusion, he noted that the Dunsmuir framework prescribed correctness review for 
questions of law which are of general importance to the legal system and outside the 
expertise of the decision-maker. In his view, conflicting administrative decisions 
raises a question of general importance, because the outcome of employment 
disputes would depend on the identity of the decision-maker;175 and since the issue 
concerned a matter of statutory interpretation, he thought that “the statutory 
interpretation point before us involves relatively little specialized labour insight 
beyond the regular means the courts have at hand when interpreting a statutory 
provision.”176  
 
In a remarkable dissenting opinion, three members of the Supreme Court 
agreed that the Adjudicator’s decision should be reviewed on a  correctness standard. 
Like Stratas JA, Côté and Brown JJ (with Moldaver J, concurring) expressed the 
concern that different Adjudicators had reached different conclusions about whether 
the Labour Code permitted federally regulated employers to dismiss without cause. 
For the dissenting justices, this raised a “serious concern for the rule of law,”177 
because “what the law means depends on whether one’s case is decided by one 
decision-maker or another.”178 Thus, despite the fact that the Adjudicator was 
                                                 
172 Harry Arthurs, “Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business” (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 1. 
 
173 Re Wilson and Atomic Energy, supra note 96 at para 52.  
 
174 Ibid at para 55.  
 
175 For a similar argument regarding judicial review of refugee claims, see Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review 
of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” 38 Queen’s LJ 1.   
 
176 Re Wilson and Atomic Energy, supra note 96 at para 58.  
 
177 Wilson, supra note 7 at para 74.  
 
2017] RENOVATING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
  
141 
interpreting his home statute, Côté and Brown JJ concluded that the Court ought to 
impose its own interpretation of the Code because rule of law values trumped what 
would otherwise be tantamount to “indiscriminate deference to the administrative 
state.”179  
 
In order to appreciate the full import of the dissenting opinion, we need to 
revisit the statutory framework which authorized the Adjudicator’s decision. To 
recap: the Labour Code gives non-unionized employees a statutory right to “make a 
complaint in writing to an inspector if the employee has been dismissed and 
considers the dismissal to be unjust”;180 the filing of a complaint triggers a statutory 
duty for the employer “to provide a written statement giving the reasons for the 
dismissal”;181 if the parties cannot resolve the complaint, the inspector is required to 
report the matter to the Federal Minister of Labour,182 who has the discretionary 
power to appoint “any person that the Minister considers appropriate as an 
adjudicator to hear and adjudicate on the complaint”;183 an adjudicator has the power 
to “determine the procedure to be followed, but shall give full opportunity to the 
parties to the complaint to present evidence and make submissions”184 and determine 
“whether the dismissal of the person who made the complaint was unjust”;185 and the 
adjudicator’s determination is deemed to be “final and shall not be questioned or 
reviewed in any court.”186  
 
Given this legal framework, it seems odd that the dissenting opinion would 
resort directly to correctness review without even pausing to note that Professor 
Schiff had been appointed by the Minister of Labour to adjudicate Wilson’s 
complaint, and Parliament had instructed courts to exercise restraint when reviewing 
the Adjudicator’s decision. To characterize reasonableness review as 
“indiscriminate” under these circumstances conveys remarkable disregard for the 
will of Parliament, the objectives of the Labour Code, and the Adjudicator’s reasons 
for upholding Wilson’s complaint. Furthermore, while the dissenting opinion makes 
a passing reference to Dunsmuir,187 its authors expended no effort to apply the 
standard of review analysis to the facts at hand. So even as a piece of common law 
reasoning, the dissenting opinion’s standard of review analysis is rather glib. Finally, 
                                                                                                                   
178 Ibid at para 85.  
 
179 Ibid at para 79.  
 
180 Canada Labour Code, supra note 89 at s 240.  
 
181 Ibid at s 241(1).  
 
182 Ibid at s 241(3)  
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187 Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 80.  
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the dissenting opinion adopts an extremely low threshold for triggering correctness 
review, by stating “[a]s long as there is one conflicting but reasonable decision, its 
very existence undermines the rule of law.”188  
 
But perhaps the most significant aspect of the dissenting opinion, is that its 
authors have consistently sought to revive the Anisminic approach to judicial review 
by expanding Dunsmuir’s presumptive categories for correctness review. In Wilson, 
Côté and Brown JJ (with Moldaver J, concurring) wrote a dissenting opinion which 
construed the Adjudicator’s decision regarding Wilson’s unjust dismissal complaint 
as involving “a matter of general importance, defining the basis of the employment 
relationship for thousands of Canadians”189 without even bothering to consider 
important institutional reasons for judges to respect the Adjudicator’s decision. In 
Edmonton East, Côté and Brown JJ wrote another dissenting opinion (with 
McLachlin CJ and Moldaver J, concurring), which construed a statutory right of 
appeal as a signal from the legislature not to defer the decisions of the Edmonton 
Assessment Review Board’s interpretation of provisions in its home statute 
regarding its power to “change” the assessed value of property. And in Commission 
scolaire de Laval v Syndicat de l’enseignement de la region de Laval, Côté J wrote a 
dissenting opinion (with Wagner and Brown JJ, concurring), which concluded that 
an arbitrator’s decision regarding the admission of evidence at a hearing raises a 
general questions of law which are of central importance to the administration of 
justice as a whole and on which an arbitrator has no expertise.  
 
All of these cases raised issues falling squarely within the statutory mandate 
of various administrative officials, agencies, and institutions. And in all of these 
cases, the administrative decision-making processes were fair and generated 
decisions which were justifiable in light of legislative objectives and other sources of 
administrative law such as prior tribunal decisions or collective agreements. 
Nevertheless, each of these cases contained a dissenting opinion which attracted 2–4 
justices who took the view that the correctness standard applied because the decision 
either involved a general question of law or the administrative decision-maker lacked 
relative expertise. While the cleavage on the Supreme Court on matters pertaining to 
the standard of review still favours a deferential standard of review when 
administrator’s interpret their home statute, there is enough disagreement to entice 
litigants to push the boundaries of Dunsmuir’s categories of correctness review in 
future cases.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
At this point, it seems Canadian administrative law has arrived at yet another 
crossroad. The question is whether the Supreme Court will stick to the path laid out 
in post-Dunsmuir case law by establishing a deferential baseline for reviewing 
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administrative decisions, or chart a new course which further complicates the 
threshold exercise of identifying the standard of review. Judging from the cases on 
this year’s docket, it appears that the Court will confront this issue in the context of 
administrative decisions concerning human rights.190 If so, resorting to precedent will 
be of little use, because there is genuine confusion over whether judges should defer 
to the decisions of human rights tribunals when they interpret their home statute. 191 
And while the Supreme Court held in Doré v Barreau du Québec192 that judges 
should assess the legality of administrative decisions concerning Charter values 
according to a reasonableness standard, its resolve on that issue seems to have 
weakened in Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General).193  Furthermore, the 
presumptive categories in Dunsmuir will be of little use, because such cases require a 
nuanced understanding of an administrator’s home statute, but also raise human 
rights issues which are of general importance. Similarly, if the Court resorts to 
Dunsmuir’s contextual standard of review analysis the contextual factors will likely 
pull in different directions. The bottom line is that, as long as the Dunsmuir 
framework remains in place, there is a strong possibility that the Court will remain 
split over whether judges should review administrative decisions concerning human 
rights on a correctness or reasonableness standard.  
 
One proposal for escaping this predicament is to eschew attempts to define formal 
categories of administrative decisions which warrant judicial deference, and 
reinvigorate an evaluative understanding of administrative law in which judges 
relinquish their interpretive monopoly over questions of law. Such an approach 
would focus instead on assessing the legality of administrative decisions in light of 
fundamental values like procedural fairness and reasoned justification. The outline 
for such an approach can be found in Abella J’s proposal for a universal 
reasonableness standard coupled with L’Heureux-Dubé J’s understanding of judicial 
review as a means for ensuring the legitimacy of administrative law. Such an 
approach would impose important procedural and justificatory burdens on 
administrative officials who decide human rights issues, burdens which are 
analogous to the burdens imposed by courts under s. 1 of the Charter.194 But even 
though these justificatory burdens entail robust limits on administrative action, they 
do not empower judges to determine outcomes for administrative officials to 
implement; rather, they serve to ensure that administrative officials exercise their 
statutorily delegated authority in a manner which is reasonably justifiable in a free 
and democratic society. If one takes this proposal seriously, then the perennial 
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haggling over the standard of review is rendered obsolete, and judges and lawyers 
can proceed to ask more important and interesting questions regarding the legality of 
administrative action.  
 
